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Multi-organizational emergency operations require 
effective information sharing. Existing information 
management tools supporting a common operational 
picture mainly convey factual information. However, 
a growing body of literature recognizes the 
importance of sharing interpretations and 
implications among the involved stakeholders for 
building a common situational understanding. This 
study aims to identify information that must be 
negotiated across the strategic, tactical, and 
operational command and control structures (C2S) for 
developing common situational understanding. Based 
on 33 interviews and a survey of emergency 
management stakeholders, information elements on 
the semantic and pragmatic levels are identified. 
Further, the results suggest how to use a secure radio 
network for facilitating information sharing so that the 
involved organizations can monitor and negotiate 
important information. These insights provide 
important lessons for improving information sharing 
in the emergency management domain.  
 
1. Introduction  
The importance of a common situational 
understanding for successful multi-organizational 
emergency management is well acknowledged in both 
research and practice [1], and the involved 
organizations require technical and organizational 
interoperability with common structures and processes 
for successful interaction [2]. In reality, the involved 
organizations have different communication 
structures, heterogeneous information needs, [3,4,5], 
different mandates and objectives [6], and many 
technologies with no interoperability [7]. These 
combined factors make the process of sharing 
information very demanding for the involved 
stakeholders. Radio networks are a commonly used 
technology for interactive verbal communication 




However, there is a need for more knowledge on how 
this can be exploited in the best possible way. 
The common operational picture (COP) is a collective 
term for many suggested technical solutions for data 
collection and distribution [8]. For example, using text 
in logging systems or e-mail with or without various 
attachments are elements in COPs. Actors collect 
information that fits their professional standpoint and 
therefore develop different perspectives of the 
situation. Following this, the sensemaking process is 
an important component when focusing on 
information sharing to achieve common situational 
understanding [4].  
Most of the information presented in the COP is 
factual and not sufficient for decision-makers to build 
a common situational understanding in complex 
emergency operations [9]. In fact, there is a need for 
information sharing at the syntactic level of factual 
information, the semantic level of interpretations, and 
the pragmatic level of implications to interpret the 
facts [10]. However, thus far, little attention has been 
paid to the role of the more implicit and complex 
concerns at the semantic and pragmatic level in the 
information sharing doctrine related to multi-
organizational emergency management [9]. Therefore, 
this study examines the following research question: 
What information elements must be exchanged at the 
semantic and pragmatic levels between the involved 
organizations in large complex events, and how can 
this be facilitated by using a radio network?  
To answer this question, literature on multi-
organizational emergency management, multiteam 
technologies for supporting COP, and common 
situational understanding were reviewed. The 
empirical basis for this study was comprised of 
interviews with 33 emergency stakeholders from 
different emergency management organizations in 
Norway. A survey conducted after a multi-
organizational exercise was also included. The data 
collection focused on large forest fires and extreme 
weather events, as these scenarios are expected to 
increase in frequency and scope due to climate 







changes and requiring multi-organizational 
emergency management at several levels. 
The analysis suggests that while factual 
information can benefit from being displayed in a 
COP, there are specific information elements at the 
semantic and pragmatic levels, such as information 
related to the security and severity of the incident, that 
must be verbally negotiated for developing common 
situational understanding. This insight provides 
important lessons on how to connect the three-tiered 
C2S with up-to-date semantic and pragmatic 
information by the pre-definition of information 
elements, information managers, and communication 
paths, using a secure radio network.       
Further, the results contribute to the expanding 
field of the information sharing doctrine [9] by 
identifying the more implicit, and complex concerns at 
the semantic and pragmatic level related to multi-
organizational emergency management. 
The study offers general lessons on the universal 
principles of the strategic, tactical and, operational 
command and control structure in emergency 
management. Furthermore, focusing on multi-
organizational collaborative communication using a 
secure radio network during emergency management 
can provide valuable support during the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
2. Multi-organizational emergency 
management 
In large, complex events, emergency response 
requires the involvement of several governmental, 
non-governmental, and volunteer organizations [12]. 
This is a cooperative process where the involved 
actors must be active and coordinated in a mutual 
dependency, and flaws in this collaboration have been 
shown in many real-world cases to result in inefficient 
outcomes [13]. Several factors need to be addressed 
for effective collaboration: technologies for 
supporting the COP, knowledge of each other's 
responsibilities and tasks, and establishment of 
common situational understanding [14]. However, 
without key information concerning the emergency 
event, cooperation is not a sufficient solution [15]. 
With more supporting organizations to be connected, 
the complexity of the communication increases. 
Undoubtedly, this is affected by information needs and 
prioritization challenges, and accordingly makes 
information sharing in such complex networks a 
problematic task. 
The front line includes the first responders that 
address the situation based on their professional 
expertise, known as the “knowledge by acquaintance.” 
The supportive organizations at the tactical and 
strategic command and control structure are the 
administrative executives who formally provide 
direction and make decisions with potential long-term 
consequences, known as the “knowledge by 
description” [16]. Insufficient key information results 
in situational uncertainty and henceforward decision-
making errors with possibly destructive consequences 
[8] such as escalation of quickly developing incidents. 
Universally, emergency management is divided 
into four phases: mitigation, preparedness, response, 
and recovery [17]. Extreme weather events tend to hit 
society with cascading effects by threatening human 
lives and damaging critical infrastructure. The first 
hours of such events are colored by chaos and 
complexity, and an effective operation in this critical 
timeline is crucial for outcome success. Therefore, the 
focus in this article is on the response phase.  
In Norway, like many other countries, the 
emergency response system consists of several teams 
from different organizations (e.g. first-responders 
including operative units and emergency dispatchers 
in the command and control centers (C3), 
municipalities, civil defense, red cross, and the county 
governor) operating as a three-tiered hierarchical 
command and control structure (C2S) [18]. This 
structure illustrates the management levels (Figure 1). 
For example, the operational C2S is defined as the first 
responders working on the scene, the tactical C2S is 
the local incident management teams supporting the 
actors on the scene, and the strategic C2S is the 
stakeholders working at the regional, state, or national 
level [19,20]. Literature refers to the different levels as 
the front line (operational level) and the remote 
response network (tactical/strategic C2S) [9]. 
 
 
Figure 1: The three-tiered command and control 
structure (C2S) 
 
2.1 Technologies for supporting the COP 
Without technologies as a platform for collecting 
and sharing information during emergency operations, 
the emergency management process as we know it 
today would be impossible. However, the 




several factors such as system flexibility, 
interoperability across the involved organizations, 
knowledge on how to use the systems, and 
infrastructure vulnerability [18]. 
Although there is no univocal definition of a COP 
[22,4,], it is largely framed as a technical system that 
aims to support the processes of decision-making [5] 
and collaboration between the different command and 
control structures [22]. It is illustrated in the literature 
as an efficient solution for information sharing and 
hence supports the stakeholders in building an 
adequate situational awareness (SA) [23] during 
emergency operations [5]. The COP also prevents a 
lack of information by making operational information 
accessible to the involved stakeholders. Therefore, the 
COP can be seen as an “information warehouse” [24] 
where the information is stored and available for 
stakeholders to collect organization-specific 
information. The COP originated from the military 
context as a “centralized information display system” 
[25] and has further been defined as a single identical 
display of relevant operational information shared by 
emergency management practitioners [6]. This 
information can be transferred between the involved 
organizations through the COP as long as the syntactic 
differences and dependencies between the 
stakeholders are known. As the emergency event 
evolves, the differences and dependencies become 
blurred resulting in different semantic interpretations 
and the need for pragmatic negotiation.  
 
2.1.1 Public safety radio network. Handheld radio 
networks are frequently used for interactive 
communication between different stakeholders in 
crisis operations. Stakeholders use different channels 
depending on their roles and information needs [18]. 
The Norwegian Public Safety Network (NPSN) was 
implemented in 2015 and replaced all other verbal 
communication systems in the first responder 
agencies. Other organizations beyond the first 
responders have since been connected to the NPSN, 
including non-governmental organizations, many 
municipalities, county governors, private critical 
infrastructure organizations, and several other public 
resources. As of May 2021, there are 59,517 
subscribers to the NPSN [26]. The terminals are GPS 
traced. One of the most important functions in the 
NPSN for multi-organizational communication is the 
ability to set up different call groups or “digital 
rooms.” It is possible to set up several call groups, both 
agency-specific and cross-organizational, during one 
emergency operation [27]. Although user surveys 
show that the stakeholders are satisfied with the NPSN 
[28], it is not flawless. On the night of December 30, 
2020, a landslide occurred in Gjerdrum, Norway, 
destroying several apartments and houses and killing 
10 people. The NPSN was frequently used in the 
emergency operation, but due to the high traffic in 
many different call groups, the base coverage was 
insufficient, and the users experienced blocked lines, 
and the actors could not access their call group.  
The Norwegian government stated in 2014 that 
organizations beyond the core users (e.g. first 
responders) must have the opportunity to use the 
NPSN. However, this involves an application for 
access and a fee. According to the provider of the 
NPSN, the adoption and usage of the NPSN in these 
organizations is varying. The resulting problems 
occurring are exemplified in the management of the 
Viking Sky cruise ship accident outside the coast of 
Norway in 2019. The evaluation report documented 
that the lack of participation and access to the NPSN 
resulted in deficient communication during the 
operation, making it challenging to build a common 
situational understanding.  
The communication in the NPSN is regulated by a 
set of union regulations that consists of expressions 
(e.g. “understood”, “repeat”, “received”) to avoid 
misunderstandings, reduce the length of messages, and 
decrease disturbances [27]. 
To secure who gives what information to whom, 
there are several heuristic rules in the form of 
acronyms, a schema following a pre-defined template 
[21]. Some examples are MIMMS [29], METAFOR, 
and HENSPE [21] These structures are not a part of 
the NPSN regulations. No structure for information 
sharing includes the three-tiered C2S in a complex 
multi-organizational emergency operation.   
       
3. Common situational understanding  
All the stakeholders involved in a crisis operation 
work together to reach the multiteam overall goal of 
saving lives and reducing damage. For this to be 
successful, it is crucial to build and maintain a 
common situational understanding, and effective 
communication for coordinated decision making [25]. 
On the individual level, the stakeholders must have 
adequate situational awareness (SA) for their agency-
specific tasks. The concept of SA is defined by 
Endsley (1995) as “the perception of the elements in 
the environment within a volume of time and space, 
the comprehension of their meaning and a projection 
of their status in the near future.” In a situation, there 
are several shared SA elements between the different 
stakeholders, which is defined in the literature as team 
SA [23]. Thus, it is not enough that one stakeholder 
knows an important SA element if it is important for 
several of the team members. At the operational C2S, 
the shared SA element can for example be smoke 




understand how this will affect their tasks and the 
other first responders` tasks for successful team 
performance. The smoke development can also be 
important for the tactical C2S, and would thus be a 
shared SA element that needs to be communicated. 
However, at the strategic C2S, the smoke development 
might be less relevant and could distract the actors` 
attention from their main tasks [30]. The idea of 
common situational understanding requires all the 
involved organizations to develop and maintain an 
adequate information position so they can develop a 
shared situational overview [9]. To achieve this, the 
involved organizations must be aware of each other`s 
information needs [28] and share SA elements if it is a 
part of other organizations’ SA requirements. 
However, even if stakeholders hold important SA 
elements, it is often challenging to know when, how, 
or with whom to share it [31]. 
 All the involved organizations at the different C2S 
will mainly focus on their own information needs to 
make decisions. For example, the stakeholders at the 
operational C2S make decisions based on “knowledge 
by acquaintance” when they operate in dynamic and 
continually changing conditions. This requires real-
time reactions [11] where the actor does not have the 
time to compare alternatives. This is called the 
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model [32], 
where the actors react to their professional experiences 
and act in a way that they “know” will aid the specific 
condition. This is based on the identification of critical 
cues through professional assessment of the situation, 
evaluation, and implementation of an action. The 
tactic and strategic C2Ss have an important role in 
supporting the activities at the operational C2S [19] 
and have the time to make decisions based on 
descriptions and checklists.  
 Since the stakeholders within the three-tiered C2S 
have different perspectives and information 
requirements for decision-making, the decision-
making processes have different logic. Team 
sensemaking is defined as “the process by which a 
team manages and coordinates its efforts to explain the 
current situation and to anticipate future situations, 
typically under uncertain or ambiguous conditions” 
(Klein et al., 2010, p. 304). If team sensemaking 
succeeds, it seems to be an important implication for 
common situational understanding, as it stresses the 
differences in assumptions and helps stakeholders to 
understand each other’s needs and constraints [4]. 
Muhren and Van de Walle (2010) identified three 
activities in the information and communication 
exchange process that were important for sensemaking 
among emergency stakeholders: (1) noticing, (2) 
interacting, and (3) enacting. Firstly, the actors must 
notice the important cues in the environment using 
both formal (e.g., inter-organizational structures) and 
informal channels (e.g., personal contacts). Secondly, 
the actors interact with others to update their 
situational understanding by staying informed, 
verifying and negotiating the information. Actors also 
interact with others to reflect on their decisions, often 
with a limited number of tools (such as the mobile 
phone) due to the time limits in emergency operations. 
Finally, actors must communicate to enable action 
[33]. This can be for example alerting the operative 
units to respond to a specific consequence of the 
emergency. Because stakeholders make sense of 
situations differently, it is important to acknowledge 
the need for negotiation in information sharing 
processes to achieve collective sensemaking.  
 
4. Methods 
The empirical basis for this study includes 
interviews of 33 Norwegian emergency management 
stakeholders from different levels of the command and 
control structures (Table 1). In addition,  a survey from 
a multi-organizational exercise organized by the 
INSITU project [1] focusing on common situational 
understanding was used to supplement the interviews 
(N=29). The respondents of the survey used the NPSN 
for verbal communication in a tabletop exercise 
involving three large forest fires occurring 
simultaneously in different areas of Southern Norway. 
A survey consisting of 28 questions regarding the use 
of NPSN was sent out to all participants directly after 
the exercise. 29 participants had used the NPSN and 
answered the survey. Both the interviews and the 
survey were conducted by the author of this paper.  
 
4.1 Interviews    
Table 1 presents an overview of the interviewees. 
The interview guide was based on transcriptions of 
audio logs from a real forest fire in South Norway in 
May 2020. The author listened and transcribed all 
telephone and radio communication between involved 
stakeholders from the first hour of the operation from 
a fire C3. The communication was presented in the 
interview guide as an objective summary (due to 
confidentiality) of the information exchange between 
different actors. Some examples of communications 
from the beginning of the incident are 1. Location 
clarifications. 2. Emergency event – fire; what is 
burning - bushes. 3. Possible time since the origin. 4. 
Fire development. 5. Possibility to extinguish the fire. 
6. Wind direction. For each information-sharing 
sequence (emergency dispatcher talking to the 
caller/lay bystander or other stakeholders), different 
questions were asked related to the information. For 
example, if their organization should be involved at 




would contact, decision-making, the use of NPSN, and 
additional information needs. 
The interview guide also had a semi-structured 
section with several open questions related to verbal 
communication in NPSN. There were also some 
agency-specific questions on the use of various call 
groups. 
The interviews lasted 60–75 minutes. Fifteen 
interviews were conducted face to face, while 18 were 
online due to the escalating Covid-19 pandemic. Some 
of the interviews with the Incident Commanders (IC) 
from the first responders were group interviews (3 
actors - Police IC, 2 actors - Ambulance IC, and 3 
actors - Fire IC) because they usually negotiate and 
make decisions together at the command location on 
the emergency site. 
 








Strategic  County Governor   3 
Strategic Directorate 1 
Tactical Police C3  6 
Tactical  Ambulance C3 2 
Tactical  Fire C3 2 
Tactical Civil Defence 1 
Tactical Energy Company 1 
Tactical  Municipality  1 
Operative  Municipality 2 
Operative  Police IC  4 
Operative  Ambulance IC 4 
Operative  Fire IC 4 
Operative  Civil Defense IC  1 
Operative  Red Cross IC 1 
 
All interviews were transcribed in full, translated 
from Norwegian into English, coded, and analyzed in 
NVivo. Firstly, the data were coded into the following 
categories: (1) what C2S he/she represented, (2) 
use/experiences with the NPSN, (3) 
communication/information sharing structures, (4) 
needed information/lack of information, and (5) 
additional technologies. Secondly, within each 
communication sequence from the forest fire scenario, 
the coding included the following categories: (1) 
information needs, (2) alert of internal and external 
stakeholders, (3) decision making, (4) information 
requiring negotiation (see table 2 on how the 
information was structured), and (5) possible 
misunderstandings. Finally, the section with open 
questions was coded into the following categories: (1) 
Ideal message exchange, (2) ideal participants in the 
call group, and (3) reflection on different participant 
views. The different categories were eventually 
compared between the different C2S and analyzed 
using an inductive method. The answers from the 
survey were listed and coded into the following 
categories: (1) reflections on how to use common call 
groups, (2) actions/decisions based on the information 
flow in the common call group, and (3) 
benefits/disadvantages of being a part of the 
communication in the common call group.   
 
 
Table 2: Information levels  
Syntactic                             Factual information that does not 
have  ambiguous meaning 
Semantic                         Information that may constitute 
interpretive differences 
Pragmatic Information that may imply different 
interests between the stakeholders 
that must be resolved 
5. Results 
The results show that all three-tiered C2S depend 
on the same basic information to have the same 
understanding of the situation they are facing. First, all 
involved organizations need to know what kind of 
situation it is (for example, accident or terror) and must 
receive a confirmation or update after the first 
report/notice. Stakeholders on all levels mention that 
the information in the first notice is often inaccurate 
regarding both the incident and position. On the 
strategic C2S, it is often a verbal notice from the tactic 
C2S; on the tactic C2S it is often a call from a lay 
bystander, and on the operational C2S they are 
provided with a radio message/alert based on the first 
call received by the tactical C2S. Secondly,  all three-
tiered C2S need to know what kind of resources the 
event seems to demand, whether the resources are on 
their way, and whether these resources are sufficient. 
Finally, all three-tiered C2S need an objective 
description of the situation, i.e. the stakeholders do not 
emphasize their own professional opinion. All 
involved stakeholders must have access to such a 
description as a substructure for the emergency 
operation. Several respondents pointed out that it is 
important not to describe the situation based on 
professional perspectives at the very beginning of the 
situation, because of the different views and 
experiences of stakeholders. As an example, a 
respondent from the ambulance service explained how 
a walking victim can be described as “appears 
undamaged” by other agencies; however, walking 
around can also be a symptom of severe head injury.  
Having a heuristic rule for information sharing is 
frequently used internally in many agencies and some 




This appears to be a constructive method for 
information sharing, and results from a HENSPE (ref 
section 2.1.1) course among first responders show that 
93.4% of 1,192 participants thought that such a 
structure of information sharing could be beneficial in 
their everyday work (K. Styrkson, professional 
developer, The Norwegian Air Ambulance, personal 
communication, 21.04.2021). In the current study, the 
survey asked whether the respondents knew the 
HENSPE structure. 63% of the respondents had not 
heard of the structure, while 38% knew of the structure 
but did not use it. None of the participants used the 
structure.  
The results of the interviews in this study indicate 
that there are some common information needs among 
the three-tiered C2S, that are important for all involved 
stakeholders to establish a basic understanding of the 
situation (Table 3). This generates the acronym IERO. 
 
Table 3: IERO acronym 
Incident Confirmation or update/ 
rejection of the situation. 
Exact position Confirmation or 
refuting/updating the position. 
Clarify the GPS format. 





Description of the elements in 
the environment, i.e., civilians, 
victims, dangers, damage. 
  
 
5.1 Information needs at the different C2 
structures 
The results indicate that there is a logical 
connection between the information needs at the 
different C2S, with the tactical C2S functioning as a 
trading zone in the middle. Several of the information 
needs at the semantic and pragmatic level at the 
strategic and operational C2S are also present at the 
tactical C2S.  
Based on the interviews, most of the information 
needs at the strategic C2S are at the syntactic level. 
This includes continuously updating the location, the 
number of people injured and dead, whether there are 
enough resources and the level of damage to critical 
infrastructure. These are elements that can be in an 
information system that functions as a COP. However, 
the level of severity, planning, and the operation 
progress need to be negotiated. One interviewee 
argued that it was important for them to think 
strategically and be supportive of the tactical and 
operational C2S. Therefore, they must plan for 
possible future status, and based on their knowledge 
and guidelines, be one step ahead. However, this 
requires a common situational understanding of the 
current elements. Overall, the results from the 
interviews indicate that the strategic C2S requires 
information at the semantic and pragmatic level, 
which must be communicated directly from the 
operational and tactical C2S. This view was echoed by 
the answers from the survey, where the respondents 
from the strategic C2S pointed out that they benefited 
from receiving information provided by the tactic and 
operational C2S.  
The information needs at the semantic and 
pragmatic level for the tactical C2S are as follows: 
level of severity, planning and operation progress, 
real and potential threats/dangers, evacuation, need 
for equipment, personnel, civilian overview, and time 
perspectives. The three first information needs are the 
same as for the strategic C2S. Because the tasks for 
this C2S are based both on professional experience 
and policy, the information must become closer to the 
actual operation, as they have staff working on the 
emergency site. One respondent underpinned that they 
have an important role in the coordination work, and 
assessing the real and potential threats/dangers is 
crucial regarding personnel security. This is echoed by 
another respondent who stated that personnel security 
has a connection to equipment and evacuation, which 
involves knowing the quickest way and bottlenecks in 
and out of the emergency site for both civilians and 
personnel. All of this must be adapted to the time 
perspective of the emergency event and the operation. 
These aspects must be negotiated into a common 
understanding across the three C2S. 
At the operational C2S, most of the information 
needs concern the different tasks that are needed and 
completed. There is a great deal of information at the 
syntactic level; however, the stakeholders must 
continually negotiate their perception of the elements 
to maintain a common situational understanding. The 
respondents reported that security, evacuation, 
number and condition of patients, and cross-
organizational interpretation of how to handle the 
emergency event in general, is information that needs 
to be negotiated between the involved stakeholders at 
the C2S. When the respondents were asked what kind 
of information they needed from the higher C2Ss, 
most indicated status on different requested resources 
and whether there are any dangerous elements near the 
emergency site were most important.  
The results in this section indicate that there is a 
logical connection between the three C2S related to 
information at the semantic and pragmatic level of 
information sharing. However, the stakeholders must 




noticing, interacting, and enacting in order to build a 
common situational understanding. The next section, 
therefore, presents the results concerning how to 
structure the verbal information exchange using a 
common call group in the NPSN to facilitate 
interactive information sharing. 
 
5.2 Information sharing across the C2S  
The results of the interviews revealed that the 
different organizations use various tools to share 
information, such as e-mail, textual logging, and 
NPSN. The first responders and supporting 
organizations are well-established users of the NPSN, 
but this seems not to be the case for the additional 
organizations. However, the results from the 
interviews and the survey indicate that it could be 
beneficial for all three C2S to have access to all the 
identified information needs using the NPSN. 
Respondents that do not use the NPSN every day, such 
as personnel from the municipality and county 
governor, said that it is difficult to organize the call 
groups and communication to support the more 
established tools such as e-mail and telephone. A 
respondent from the operational C2S who was not a 
first responder said that they had greatly benefited 
from common call groups. However, there was a lack 
of involvement from some stakeholders at the tactical 
and strategic C2S.  
When asked whether the verbal communication in 
a common call group supplemented syntactic level 
information, the majority (90%) of the survey 
respondents were positive. Further, 72.4% answered 
that they received a high amount of relevant 
information that increased their situational awareness 
by having access to the information exchange in the 
call group. Additionally, a recurrent theme in the 
interviews was the benefit of using common call 
groups to build common situational understanding. 
Overall, the results indicate that access to a common 
call group is important; however, there is a need for 
pre-defined guidelines for different scenarios. For 
example, one respondent from the tactical C2S 
expressed that the communication usage in the NPSN 
is confusing and that many stakeholders have 
problems with the organization of the common call 
groups and knowing who should speak. Another 
respondent reported that the crisis staff must carry 
more radios to monitor several call groups because it 
is not possible to monitor several call groups 
simultaneously on one radio alone.   
The respondents in the interviews and the survey 
were further asked to suggest how to structure the 
verbal communication for message exchange between 
the different C2S. The respondents from the strategic 
C2S indicated that they would benefit from monitoring 
a common call group to gain a higher level of 
situational awareness. In some cases, the opportunity 
to negotiate information would help them to be a part 
of the operation in a more proactive way. A respondent 
from the strategic C2S said that by using a common 
call group, they could share information in real-time in 
a one-to-many modus, which could improve their 
sensemaking of the situation. However, 
communication paths must be pre-defined even if the 
organizations have access to the same common call 
group. One of the respondents said that the channel 
between the tactical C2S and the strategic C2S is 
important, but often missing. For example, the county 
governor could have a communication path against the 
involved directorate, the staff at the C3 in charge, and 
the municipality. Further, the different organizations 
at the tactical C2S must communicate with each other 
and the staff at the leading C3. At the operational C2S, 
two divergent and often conflicting discourses 
emerged when discussing ways to structure verbal 
communication in a common call group. Particularly 
the actors from the first responders’ agencies felt that 
their high workload meant that they did not have the 
time to participate in a common call group that 
involved organizations outside of the first responders. 
Other respondents (e.g., civil defense, energy 
company, red cross) believed it necessary to have such 
access. Hence, the results are somewhat conflicting 
between the different representatives from the 
operational C2S.  
A majority of the respondents mentioned the 
importance of the communication discipline described 
in the NPSN regulations. This includes the expressions 
for avoiding misunderstandings between the 
stakeholders involved.  
 
6. Discussion 
In this paper, the research question asked was: 
What information elements must be exchanged at the 
semantic and pragmatic level between the involved 
organizations in extreme weather events, and how can 
this be facilitated by using a radio network? The 
inductive approach for analyzing the qualitative 
interviews with 33 Norwegian stakeholders from 9 
different emergency management organizations 
indicates that the strategic, tactical, and operational 
C2Ss have several information needs that must be 
negotiated across the C2S to build a common 
situational understanding. In addition, some common 
initial information needs for building a basis for the 
involved stakeholders` SA were identified (the IERO 
structure). The sharing of these initial information 
needs can be structured as a heuristic rule. Using 
heuristic rules for information sharing is an efficient 




communication processes can be complicated in 
stressful environments. For the information sharing to 
be effective, the sender must communicate in a way 
that the information is perceived and understood by 
the receiving party/ies [34]. Using an operative 
communication structure such as the IERO concept 
suggested in this study can be an effective solution. 
For example, implementing the elements in the IERO 
concept as part of the initiating actions of a common 
procedure can facilitate the development of an early 
common situational understanding.  
During the emergency operation, semantic and 
pragmatic information needs must be shared across the 
C2S to build a common situational understanding. To 
achieve this, a more mutual and dynamic 
communication structure is required between the 
three-tiered C2S, as they are dependent on each other’s 
knowledge, planning, and operation progress. The 
stakeholders have different professional backgrounds 
and perspectives on the situation, which makes the 
collaboration even more complex [7]. Another 
important issue that must be considered is mutual trust, 
as this is key to facilitate effective communication 
[34].The academic discussions on COP often refer to 
the warehouse philosophy [24], which mainly includes 
factual syntactic information [9]. The interviewees 
described several semantic and pragmatic information 
needs that should be communicated in real-time, 
including updates and negotiation of information. 
Negotiation is important for the process of team 
sensemaking both vertically and horizontally among 
the three-tiered C2S. Since team sensemaking 
concerns the involved stakeholders' understanding of 
the current and future status of a situation [32], it has 
a crucial impact on the content of the shared 
information. The semantic and pragmatic information 
levels require interaction and enacting, which is 
important for building team sensemaking among the 
involved stakeholders. 
The semantic and pragmatic information needs at the 
strategic C2S support the strategic C2S`s role to think 
ahead and make decisions with a long-term impact on 
the situation [18]. For example, the level of severity 
has something to do with available resources, and this 
is important for the strategic C2S to understand. Of 
course, sharing factual information is important for 
common understanding. However, for this to be as 
effective as possible, the distribution of the 
information must facilitate interpretations and 
implications for decision-making based on factual 
information. The tactical C2 structure appears as the 
most complex level regarding information needs since 
they function as a trading zone between the strategic 
and operational C2Ss. The information needs at the 
strategic and operational C2Ss are also found among 
the information needs at the tactical C2S. The 
operational C2S decision-making is based on the RPD 
model, known as “knowledge by acquaintance” [35]. 
This makes the sensemaking process highly based on 
the activity of notice [33]. This might explain the 
expressed need for “cross-organizational 
interpretations” of different situations (section 5.1). 
The respondents at the operational C2S underpinned 
the importance of the collaboration at the incident 
command location on the emergency site. As the 
stakeholders at the operational C2S usually make rapid 
decisions based on the recognition of familiar cues 
[36], it is likely that the communication between actors 
is a continual discourse. Based on the results, Figure 2 
demonstrates how a common call group can be used 
for information sharing. The black arrows represent 
communication paths within base coverage in the 
NPSN, while the blue arrows represent terminals in 
direct mode (e.g., for use without base station 
coverage). This will release network resources and 
enable the operation group to perform without 
interference from other users. For example, the 
communication blocks in the Gjerdrum landslide 
operation (see section 2.2.1) could have been avoided.  
 
 
Figure 2: Using a common call group for 
information sharing  
 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the common call group is 
open for all the C2S. As the majority of the 
stakeholders from the first responders in the 
operational C2S are quite determined that they cannot 
monitor any additional call group(s), several of them 
mentioned the opportunity for an information manager 
stationed at the command location. The information 
manager would support the IC by communicating with 
the other C2S [4]. The information manager must, in 
this case, be aware of the different information levels 
and function as a trading zone between the IC and the 
teams working in the front line. Further, the C3 in 




Police) must be a part of the common call group. The 
strategic C2S have access to the common call group 
and thus have the opportunity to communicate with the 
different organizations at the lower level C2S. For 
these communication paths to be optimal predefined 
multi-organizational procedures must be well 
implemented at all C2S, and the involved actors must 
receive practical training in advance. The training can 
be an important arena for building mutual trust as it is 
crucial for effective information sharing [34].  
 
7. Conclusions and further work  
The results of this study show that several 
information elements must be negotiated across the 
three-tiered C2S for collective sensemaking and 
common situational understanding. Today, the 
technical and organizational structures and processes 
between the C2Ss are not organized as one entity, and 
sharing verbal information in real-time is difficult to 
manage. The systems used between many stakeholders 
are technical solutions that share factual information 
at the syntactic level, such as text in logging systems 
or e-mail with or without various attachments. This is 
not sufficient for information sharing at the semantic 
and pragmatic levels, which is crucial for building 
common situational understanding. This paper 
suggests using a secure radio network to facilitate 
verbal communication. With pre-defined 
communication paths and knowledge of what 
information is important to negotiate, common call 
groups can be an important tool in multi-
organizational emergency management involving the 
three-tiered C2S. Further, the results add to the 
expanding field of the information sharing doctrine, 
focusing on the more implicit and complex concerns 
at the semantic and pragmatic level related to multi-
organizational emergency management.  
The practical implication of this study is the notion 
of the IERO structure. Using this as a 
heuristic/guideline can facilitate sharing common 
information that is needed at the beginning of an 
operation for building common situational 
understanding. Further, the emergency management 
organizations must consider the need for negotiation 
of different information elements, and facilitate the 
structure for communication that supplements the 
factual information that is provided by the COP. This 
can be done by developing multi-organizational 
guidelines for verbal status reports in a common call 
group (such as shown in figure 2) that support the need 
for negotiation on the pre-defined themes of 
information elements.  Also, the focus on the tactical 
C2S as a trading zone and the role of information 
managers at the operational level seems to be 
important and necessary.  
The generalizability of these results is subject to 
certain limitations. For instance, while the majority of 
other countries have only one emergency number, 
Norway has one dedicated emergency number for each 
of the different first responder agencies. The 
communication structures will therefore become 
somewhat different at the operational and tactical C2S. 
Despite this limitation, the study adds to our 
understanding of the need for information sharing at 
the semantic and pragmatic level, and how a public 
safety radio network and verbal communication can 
facilitate this. A greater focus on interpretations, 
implications, and collective sensemaking could 
produce interesting findings that can contribute to the 
discussion on COP and common situational 
understanding.  
A question raised by this study is how the tactical 
C2S can facilitate a communicative trading zone 
between the strategic and the operational C2S without 
becoming the weakest link. Also, an extensive 
discussion on to what degree trust issues in 
information sharing between different organizations 
would affect the communication is recommended. 
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